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70 is the new 60: We need to stop characterising the growth
of older people in the UK in alarmist ways
Pat Thane argues that there is a danger of stressing the costs of the ageing population too
much and the positive inputs of older people to economy and society too little. In reality
many older people are far from being burdens on the young; rather, they contribute
substantially to their families and society.
The demographic f uture is much discussed. The Of f ice of  Budget Responsibility’s Fiscal
Sustainability Report (July 2012) stresses the likely f uture costs to government revenue
of  the ageing population and suggests these could be partially of f set by increased immigration by
younger people. The Report on the 2011 census has been greeted with surprise because it shows the
f astest rise in population in England and Wales in any 10-year period since the f irst census in 1801. This
was partly due to the rise in numbers over 65, which was predicted in 2001, and an increase in children
under 5, which was not. Immigration has also risen, though by less than at f irst appears: according to
ONS, 45 per cent of  the headline rise is due to undercounting in the 2001 census. It is impossible to
know how much of  the migration is long or short- term.
The unprecedented ageing of  the population has caused concern since at least the 1980s, especially
since it was paralleled by a decline in f ertility, arousing f ears that the pension, health and care needs of
the growing retired generation would impose intolerable burdens on a shrinking younger working
generation and even, some suggested rather sensationally (such as David Willetts The Pinch: How the
Bayboomers took their children’s future and why they should give it back, 2010), produce conf lict between
the generations.
The census f igures should suggest caution about uncrit ical acceptance of  demographic projections.
There was a similar panic about population ageing in the 1930s and 40s due to unprecedented f ertility
decline and growing longevity. Keynes, Beveridge and others warned of  the need to prepare f or a long-
run demographic shif t. Then the birth-rate rose f rom the 1940s (the ‘baby-boom’), the concerns were
f orgotten and a permanent return to high f ertility assumed until it  f ell again in the late 1960s. This new
demographic pattern was again assumed to be permanent, until f ertility started to rise f rom 2001. Of
course policy-makers need to work with f orecasts, but we should learn f rom history to treat
demographic assumptions cautiously, as indeed the Treasury and ONS do. The more so because they
are as dif f icult to inf luence as to predict. There are no certain policies to increase f ertility, and past
shif ts have been unexpected. It is unacceptable to prevent people living longer healthier lives. The one
variable that can be inf luenced to some extent is migration, hence the recommendations of  the OBR.
We should also be cautious about negative assumptions about the ‘burden’ imposed by the growing
numbers of  over-65s and generalizing about this large and diverse ‘generation’ aged between their 60s
and over 100. Lif e expectancy has lengthened, but so has healthy lif e expectancy (HLE). In other words,
people live longer, but more are f it and active to later ages than ever bef ore. According to ONS, on
average in 1981, at birth males could expect to live to 70.9, f or 64.4 years in good or f airly good health.
By 2006 to 77.2 and 68.5. For women, in 1981 76.8 and 66.7; in 2006 81.5 and 70.5.
However, these averages hide socio-economic inequalit ies. A government report in 2010, Fair Society,
Healthy Lives, concluded that the poorest people in UK die on average 7 years earlier than the richest;
the gap in ‘disease f ree lif e expectancy’ is a shocking 17 years. There is a similar gap in incomes. Average
gross pensioner incomes rose 44 per cent between 1994/5 and 2008/9, f uelling images of  oldies enjoying
sun-soaked leisure, but the highest f if th of  pensioner couples had net median incomes 3.8 times those
of  the lowest f if th. In 2008-9 1.8m pensioners lived in poverty according to the most commonly used
of f icial measure.
One proposed solution to the presumed costs of  the retired population is to take advantage of  their
growing HLE and raise pension and retirement ages, f ixed in the dif f erent circumstances of  the mid 20th
century. But Fair Society, Healthy Lives f ound that about 20 per cent of  workers retire bef ore age 65 due
to ill-health; 75 per cent do not have disability- f ree lif e expectancy to 68, the currently proposed target
age f or retirement. A shif t f rom an inf lexible retirement age of  65 to 68 would deprive many, mostly
poorer, older people of  their right to a state pension, shif t ing them onto disability benef its, paid at lower
rates and subject to stringent conditions. An alternative which has not apparently been considered is a
f lexible state pension/retirement age determined by ability/disability.
This is not a new idea. The f irst state pension in the world, introduced in Germany in the 1880s, was paid
on this basis. It was also Beveridge’s proposed response in his 1942 report on the ageing of  the
population in the 1940s: people should be incentivized to stay at work with higher pensions f or each year
worked past 65. If  the post-1945 government had taken up his proposal current problems would have
been prevented.
But there is a danger of  stressing the costs of  the ageing population too much and the posit ive inputs
of  older people to economy and society too litt le. The Home Of f ice Citizenship survey (recently
discontinued) has shown that since 2001 about 30 per cent of  over 60s are regular volunteers with
charit ies, increasingly overseas charit ies, putting their lif etime skills to work to help poorer countries,
and up to 65 per cent of  over 65s give inf ormal but f requent care to sick and disabled relatives, f riends
and neighbours, relieving the state of  considerable costs. 49 per cent of  over 65s regularly look af ter
children, mostly grandchildren, enabling their parents to work. 1 in 3 working mothers rely on
grandparents f or childcare. WRVS estimates that over 65s make a net contribution to the UK economy,
af ter deduction of  pensions, welf are and health care costs, of  £40b through taxation, expenditure,
donations to charity and volunteering. Grandparents Plus estimates that 16 per cent of  those in their 60s
and 30 per cent in their 70s give f inancial support to grandchildren and children.
Many older people are f ar f rom being burdens on the young. Many others are too poor to have a choice.
Better of f  older people could contribute more. It is of ten suggested that universal benef its like winter
f uel allowances and f ree transport should be means-tested. However, means-testing is costly and
inef f icient. At least 20 per cent of  eligible claimants, of ten the neediest, f ail to claim. It would be more
ef f icient to tax such benef its and remove the f avourable tax allowances currently received by about 40
per cent of  all over 65s. The Chancellor made a start in the last budget by f reezing the existing allowance
and removing it f rom those who will reach 65 f rom 2013. It is hard to understand why those with incomes
high enough to be taxed, who happen to be over 65, should pay less tax than others. Though given the
f urore the ‘granny-tax’ aroused, and the propensity of  older people to vote, governments may lack the
courage.
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